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It used to be a major enterprise of philosophers to compete 
for the most striking way to describe the human differentia. 
Surely the most famous and long-lasting such effort was Aris-
totle's "the human being is the rational animal," but there have 
been other formulae of note put forward too: Plato's "the human 
being is the featherless biped" is memorable in its own way, as 
well as the definition I associate with Cicero, that the human be-
ing is the "beast with red cheeks," i.e., the only being that 
blushes, or has shame. Let me propose a new entry into the 
"human being is" ... sweepstakes: "the human being is the anni-
versary celebrating animal." So far as I know, the zoologists 
have discovered no other animal which shares this peculiar pro-
pensity with us, as, for example, the beaver and the bee share our 
technological proclivities. 
We are now engaged in the celebration of a great anniver-
sary-ten years of Constitutional Commentary-but at the same 
time we might note the coincidental fact of another relevant an-
niversary: just twenty years ago the Association of American 
Law Schools bestowed its highly prestigious Coif Award on a 
very thick, bright-green book that was only peripherally about 
law-John Rawls's A Theory of Justice.I These two coincident 
anniversaries mark events which turned out to be much inter-
twined. Despite the fact that Rawls's book has hardly anything 
in it that we. would now call constitutional theory, it became, indi-
rectly, a major force in the field. In retrospect this appears some-
what remarkable, for the book has little by way of the usual 
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apparatus of such theory-its very complete index, for example, 
has no entry for constitutional or judicial review, none for 
Supreme Court, barely any for constitution, and in place of all 
these things has an elaborate theory of civil disobedience. None-
theless, the two decades since Rawls's Coif Award have been de-
cades of the dominance of constitutional theory, and Rawls's 
Theory has been a major part of the thinking of many of the chief 
figures in this field. One need go no further, say, than Ronald 
Dworkin, to note the indirect importance Rawls's Theory has 
had. 
If the past two decades have been decades of constitutional 
theory, they have also been (and for much the same reasons) 
post-positivist decades. Roughly from World War II on, legal 
positivism and related views (legal realism, sociological jurispru-
dence) dominated American legal thinking, with but a few dis-
senting or questioning voices-Lon Fuller and Alexander Bickel 
are two who come to mind. Although legal positivism is not 
without implications for understanding constitutionalism, judicial 
review, and the like, these implications are relatively easily stated 
and did not yield a large or thriving constitutional theory indus-
try. Our post-positivist age teems with constitutional theories, 
however, and these seem to be of two main types. On the one 
hand are the various post-modernist theories, for the most part 
oriented around issues of textual interpretation, meaning, and 
objectivity. Here we find theories heavily influenced by Hans-
Georg Gadamer and his hermeneutical emphasis, or Jacques 
Derrida and his deconstructivist impulse. On the other hand is a 
type of theory I am tempted to call post-Rawlsean, for even 
though it does not always draw much in explicit detail from 
Rawls, it draws much in spirit and approach from him. Not only 
Dworkin, but David Richards, Michael Perry, Frank Michelman, 
Sotirios Barber, Stephen Macedo, and many others exemplify 
this post-Rawlsean strain of constitutional theory. The factor 
that differentiates post-Rawlsean from post-modernist theories is 
the former's greater concern with moral justification and appeal 
to principles of morality or justice in order to articulate a role for 
the Constitution and the Court. 
These two chief types of constitutional theory move in quite 
different directions. The post-Rawlseans reject positivism's rigid 
separation of law and morality and instead describe or advocate 
a greater intermixture of the two, especially a greater role for 
morality in law, based in large part on a rejection of the posi-
tivists' frequent skepticism about the possibility of a firm or "ob-
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jective" grounding for moral judgments. The renewed 
confidence in moral judgment betrayed by this group of theorists 
owes much, to understate the case, to Rawls. The post-modern-
ists, on the other hand, challenge positivism's assumption that 
legal interpretation is (for the most part) a relatively straightfor-
ward enterprise: positivists believe it is the job of courts to say 
what the law is, and do not see that as a problematic task. As the 
post-Rawlseans challenge positivism by asserting the "objectiv-
ity" of moral judgment, so the post-modernists challenge positiv-
ism by denying the objectivity of interpretation. Nicely 
epitomizing the differences between the two approaches was the 
famous Ronald Dworkin-Stanley Fish face-off of some years ago, 
with Dworkin representing the post-Rawlsean and Fish the post-
modern position. 
Although the two types of theory move in quite different 
directions theoretically, they tend to converge practically, and 
thus the differences between them are not always clearly per-
ceived. Their similarities can be seen in their common enemies-
legal positivism, originalism-and in their common results-non-
interpretivism, anti-originalism, and judicial activism. Thus con-
stitutional theory in the post-positivist era has mostly been a se-
ries of briefs for a more active and more independent judicial 
role; by contrast, constitutional theory in the positivist era was, 
for the most part, an attempt to argue for the subordination of 
courts to democratic majorities. 
Now, almost concurrently with the dual anniversaries of his 
Coif Award and Constitutional Commentary's birth, Rawls has 
issued a new and in important ways quite different version of his 
theory of justice, raising the question whether Constitutional 
Commentary's second decade will be lived in the shadow of the 
new Rawls as its first decade was lived (partly) in the shadow of 
the old Rawls. The differences between the new and the old 
Rawls certainly bear on matters of constitutional theory. For one 
thing, the new book, Political Liberalism, contains an explicit 
constitutional theory. For another, Rawls gently, but explicitly, 
takes issue with the approach to judicial action presented by the 
leading post-Rawlsean constitutional theorist, Ronald Dworkin.z 
Given the fact that it is Rawls, and given the fact that he has now 
become so much more explicit, it is almost certain that the new 
Rawls will have a real impact on the continuing enterprise of 
constitutional theory. My goal in this essay is to explore New 
2. John Rawls, Political Liberalism VI § 6.3 at 236-37 n.23 (Columbia U. Press, 
1993). 
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Rawls and his approach to constitutional theory, and to ruminate 
a bit on how satisfactory this neo-Rawlsean constitutional theory 
is. 
Constitutional theory looms larger in New Rawls than in 
old, because the themes of protection of liberty and limited gov-
ernment take on substantially greater importance in Liberalism 
than in Theory. This is signalled in part by the appearance in the 
later book of a concern which hardly surfaced before: Rawls now 
clearly conceives the state as a coercive apparatus. "[P]olitical 
power is always coercive power backed by the government's use 
of sanctions .... "3 In Theory Rawls hardly noticed the problem 
of coercion, for the most part emphasizing instead society as a 
system of "social cooperation."4 Thus Rawls now develops a new 
theory of legitimacy, emphasizing the boundaries of legitimate 
state coercion.s With the recognition of those boundaries comes 
a heightened dedication to constitutionalism. 
Between Theory and Liberalism the problem of constitu-
tionalism has become more urgent for Rawls. The most obvious 
or surface reason for this is a certain practical difficulty that 
Rawls claims inspired the shift from Theory to Liberalism: "A 
modem democratic society is characterized ... by a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines .... 
No one of those doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally."6 
Nor can we expect any one to be so affirmed. Yet Theory 
presented a doctrine of justice that Rawls expected to become 
the one accepted doctrine. "An essential feature of a well-or-
dered society associated with justice as fairness is that all its citi-
zens endorse this conception .... "7 Theory in a sense posited 
the public acceptance of Theory itself as the necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the realization of justice. Political Liberalism, 
on the other hand, seeks the appropriate response to the fact of 
irremediable pluralism, which Rawls "assumes" is "the normal 
result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of 
free institutions."s Rawls is quite insistent that his acceptance of 
this pluralism of ultimate views does not bespeak skepticism on 
his part about the possibilities of genuine knowledge regarding 
justice, the good life, and morality, or their religious and philo-
3. Id. at 136; cf. II § 4.1 at 68. 
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 3 (Harv. U. Press, 1971). 
5. Rawls, Political Liberalism I § 6.2 at 37, II § 3.2 at 60, § 3.4 at 62, III; § 8.1 at 
125-26, IV§ 1.4 at 138, § 1.6 at 140, VI§ 2.1 at 217 (cited in note 2). 
6. Id. at xvi. 
7. Id. 
8. ld. at 4. 
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sophical groundings. Rawls "does not question that many polit-
ical and moral judgments ... are correct .... Nor does [he] 
question the possible truth of affirmations of faith. Above all 
[he] does not argue that we should be hesitant and uncertain, 
much less skeptical, about our own beliefs."9 Rawls pithily sum-
marizes his point with the very strong claim that so far is his view 
from being skeptical that "it would be fatal" to it if it were "skep-
tical about ... truth."1o New Rawls is no positivist. 
Inevitable pluralism rests not on skepticism but rather on 
"recogni[tion of] the practical impossibility of reaching reason-
able and workable political agreement in judgment on the truth 
of comprehensive doctrines."n Pluralism is (mostly) not the con-
sequence of epistemological failings, but of practical necessities. 
There are certain "burdens of judgment," unnecessary to detail 
here, which, while they do not disprove the possibility of knowl-
edge of moral and political truth, yet strongly predispose freely 
thinking human beings to differ in their understandings of the 
large religious, philosophical, and moral questions that face hu-
manity. It is, Rawls concludes, perfectly reasonable that there 
should be such disagreement, and it would be quite unreasonable 
to expect otherwise.12 It is most unreasonable to expect others to 
conform to one's own comprehensive view of the good. 
If pluralism is the inevitable result of the exercise of human 
reason under conditions of freedom, then the only means 
whereby pluralism can be overcome is the use of power of some 
sort to overcome freedom. Since the existence of such pluralism 
is reasonable, and the acceptance of it is therefore also reason-
able, impositions of authority to overcome pluralism are illegiti-
mate. "[T]hose who insist, when fundamental political questions 
are at stake, on what they take as true but others do not, seem to 
others simply to insist on their own beliefs when they have the 
political power to do so."IJ Inspired by his insight into inevitable 
pluralism, Rawls recasts the aim or purpose of his theory. The 
aim of Theory was to present a philosophic doctrine of justice, 
built upon the contractarian tradition, as a position superior to 
the then-dominant approach, utilitarianism. The aim of Political 
Liberalism, however, "is to resolve the impasse in the democratic 
9. ld. II § 3.5 at 63. 
10. ld. IV § 4.1 at 150. 
11. ld. II § 3.5 at 63. 
12. ld. II § 2 at 54-58. 
13. Id. II § 3.3 at 61; cf. I § 6.2 at 37. 
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tradition"14 or "in our recent political history."1s The aim is 
more immediately practical, and relates to his perception of irre-
deemable disagreement. The impasse cannot be broken by fol-
lowing the strategy of Theory, that is, by adumbrating a doctrine 
of justice at the same level as those doctrines that have produced 
the impasse. He must proceed on the basis of accepting the plu-
ralism and thus, in a way, accepting the impasse. His solution to 
this paradoxical task is the distinction between two types of con-
ceptions of justice-political and comprehensive. 
Comprehensive doctrines are more familiar to us, for they 
are the types of which utilitarianism and Rawls's own justice as 
fairness were taken as instances in A Theory of Justice.16 Com-
prehensive doctrines, apparently, are the kind of "religious, phil-
osophical, and moral doctrines" that citizens normally hold. 
They are comprehensive in that they relate typically to a very 
wide range of moral and political phenomena.17 "Religious and 
philosophical doctrines express views of the world and of our life 
with one another, severally and collectively, as a whole."1s Com-
prehensive doctrines appeal for their validity to what Rawls 
loosely calls "metaphysics," a notion which he unfortunately 
leaves very vague, but which seems to include appeals to such 
disparate things as "specific metaphysical or epistemological doc-
trine[s]" and to the kind of deep faith commitments one finds in 
religious believers.19 Comprehensive conceptions appeal to what 
we might be tempted to call the ultimate truths of philosophy or 
religion. 
The political conception of justice differs from the compre-
hensive on all these matters. Its subject matter is limited in scope 
to the political realm-to what Rawls calls "the 'basic structure' 
of society," defined as "a society's main political, social, and eco-
nomic institutions."zo Many important moral matters thus lie 
outside its coverage. It is also "free-standing" in that "it is 
neither presented as, nor as derived from, . . . comprehensive 
doctrine[s]."21 It is "presented independently of any wider com-
prehensive religious or philosophical doctrine."zz It thus "offers 
no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond 
14. Id. VIII § 9 at 338. 
15. Id. VIII § 14 at 368. 
16. Id. at xvi. 
17. Id. I § 2.2 at 13. 
18. Id. II § 2.4 at 58. 
19. Id. I § 1.4 at 10; cf. I § 5.1 at 29 n.31. 
20. Id. I § 2.1 at 11; cf. VI § 4.1 at 223. 
21. Id. I§ 2.2 at 11. 
22. Id. VI § 4.1 at 223. 
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what is implied by the political conception itself. "23 It aims to be 
more or less neutral in its derivation between all the various 
comprehensive doctrines to which citizens adhere in society. 
This is the quality which promises a way beyond the "impasse"; 
neither originating in, nor making any judgments about, the truth 
or value of any comprehensive conception of justice, the political 
conception aims to find its ground completely independently of 
the various conflicting comprehensive doctrines, and thus would 
in principle seem capable of achieving widespread (universal?) 
support despite inevitable pluralism and our contemporary im-
passe. This aspect of the political conception tempts me to call it 
a second order doctrine, as opposed to the comprehensive first 
order doctrines. Like the theory of religious toleration, which 
takes as its point of departure an analogous impasse of religious 
doctrines, the political conception is not a set of commitments at 
the same level as the competing comprehensive doctrines. Also 
like religious toleration, accepting the political conception does 
not require one to eschew continuing to hold one or another of 
the competing doctrines, so far, that is, as it is compatible with 
the principles of justice as developed via the political 
conception.z4 
If the political conception is foreclosed from appealing to 
any comprehensive doctrine, or from being itself a comprehen-
sive doctrine, to what can it appeal? Can we generate a concep-
tion of justice merely from the fact of impasse (or inevitable 
pluralism) and the resultant resolve to avoid appeals to all such 
comprehensive doctrines? Is it enough to "agree to disagree"? 
Rawls thinks not, for he seeks a theory of a genuinely moral 
character, which a mere Hobbesian modus vivendi does not pro-
vide.zs Moreover, he still seeks the same sort of "thick theory of 
justice" he had presented in Theory, and an "agreement to disa-
gree" is not substantive enough to produce such a theory. 
Rawls thus includes a third element in his notion of a polit-
ical conception. "The content . . . of a political conception of 
justice ... is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen 
as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society." 
Rather than looking to the kind of ultimate truths about "Hu-
manity, God and Nature" proclaimed within one or another of 
the comprehensive doctrines, Rawls instead "starts from within a 
23. Id. I § 1.4 at 10; I § 2.2 at 12; VI § 4.1 at 223. 
24. Id. II § 3 at 58-66. 
25. Id. IV § 3.4 at 147-49. 
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certain political tradition. "26 This way of generating content for 
a political conception coheres with the original inspiration for the 
turn to political conceptions: 
Justice as fairness aims at uncovering a public basis of justifica-
tion on questions of political justice given the fact of reason-
able pluralism. Since justification is addressed to others, it 
proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common; and so we 
begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public 
political culture in the hope of developing from them a polit-
ical conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in 
judgment. .. . 21 
For present purposes it is not necessary to supply the details of 
how Rawls moves from his new approach to theory to his old 
conclusions. Purporting to draw from widespread and non-con-
troversial ideas in the political culture, he reconstructs his famous 
Original Position and the deliberation there which is to produce 
agreement on his two principles of justice. Some of the details 
are significantly different from Theory, and, it must be said, are 
improvements over the latter. Where two decades of critics had 
shown that many key elements of the Rawlsean deductions in 
Theory were unsuccessful (for example, the derivation of the pri-
macy of liberty) many of the same elements are much less vulner-
able to criticism in Liberalism. 
I pass over these many interesting matters, however, in or-
der to come to the feature of Rawls's new theory which bears 
most directly on his development of a constitutional theory, his 
notion of public reason. The Supreme Court comes into Rawls's 
theory as "exemplar of public reason." Rawls generates the no-
tion of public reason by pressing the question of legitimacy ad-
verted to above: "when may citizens ... properly exercise their 
coercive political power over one another?" Rawls's most gen-
eral answer to that question is the "liberal principle of legiti-
macy": the "exercise of political power is proper and hence 
justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitu-
tion the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be ex-
pected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable 
to them as reasonable and rational. "28 This foundation is a 
rather complicated way of saying that legitimate coercion is coer-
26. Id. I § 2.3 at 13-14; cf. VI § 4.1 at 223. 
27. Id. III § 2.2 at 100-01. 
28. Id. VI § 2.1 at 217. Another effort to develop this notion of public reason into a 
constitutional theory is Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, 
and the Constitution, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 20-37 (1992). 
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cion used according to the Rawlsean principles of justice under-
stood as a political conception. 
Almost the very definition of illegitimate coercion in the 
context of inevitable and reasonable pluralism is the use of 
power in the service of one or another comprehensive doctrine. 
"[O]n matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice, the 
basic structure [of society] and its public policies are to be justifi-
able to all citizens . . . . This means that in discussing constitu-
tional essentials and matters of basic justice we are not to appeal 
to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines . . . . "29 
Legitimacy requires a special kind of justificatory discourse, that 
is, discourse based on a political conception. This special or even 
artificial discourse requires that citizens and officials set aside 
what they consider "the whole truth" about moral and political 
matters as expressed in their comprehensive conceptions, and in-
stead deploy "public reason." 
The artificiality of public reason may appear strange at first, 
but Rawls finds strong precedent for it in quite familiar practices. 
There are many "cases where we grant that we should not appeal 
to the whole truth as we see it, even when it might be readily 
available." Rawls finds the rules of evidence in criminal cases to 
be just such an instance-we place a number of "artificial" con-
straints on what may enter a trial as an acceptable fact and at-
tempt to make decisions on the basis of this constrained 
information.3o 
Courts, even as they are now constructed, are already a 
good, if not perfectly consistent, model of what he means by the 
operation of public reason. "[P]ublic reason is the sole reason 
the court exercises. It is the only branch of government that is 
visibly on its face the creature of that reason and of that reason 
alone."3t Rawls has a number of somewhat separate but clearly 
related points in mind. First, courts uniquely must "justify [in 
public] ... why they vote as they do or make their grounds con-
sistent and fit them into a coherent constitutional view over the 
whole range of their decisions."32 In our ordinary thinking about 
judges and their task, we ascribe more or less the same kind of 
limitations to what judges may properly do as Rawls ascribes to 
public reason as such. 
29. Id. VI § 4.3 at 224-25; cf. I § 1.4 at 10. 
30. Id. VI § 2.3 at 218-19. 
31. Id. VI § 6.3 at 235. 
32. Id. 
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The justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal 
morality, nor the ideals and virtues of morality generally. 
Those they must view as irrelevant. Equally, they cannot in-
voke their or other people's religious or philosophical views.33 
As these last quotations might suggest, Rawls's theory is in-
teresting and promising for constitutional studies because it 
points to a middle way between the polar positions of originalism 
and non-originalism, interpretivism and non-interpretivism, into 
which constitutional theory has unfortunately fallen. Rawls dif-
fers from the more conservative partisans in the present interpre-
tation wars in that he (implicitly) rejects any strictly originalist or 
positivist approach to constitutional decision. As Rawls puts it, 
"[T]he political values of public reason provide the Court's basis 
for interpretation. "34 That is to say, the court is not limited to 
mere text or history for its principles of decision (as originalists 
would have it), but may or even ought to appeal to the set of not 
strictly legal principles contained in a political conception of 
justice. 
Rawls equally opposes the other side, including those who 
seemed most inspired by his own earlier position. The Old Rawl-
seans, as opposed to New Rawls, do not distinguish between 
comprehensive and political conceptions, and thus have a much 
blurrier notion of the difference between public and non-public 
reason. When they reject the typical limitations on judicial ac-
tion contained in the strictures of legal positivism and interpre-
tive theories like originalism, they bring the judge into a situation 
of merging moral, or comprehensive, notions with the law. As an 
illustration, consider the following from the pen of the most im-
portant of the "old Rawlseans": "[e]ach judge's interpretive the-
ories [and practices] are grounded in his own convictions about 
the 'point' -the justifying purpose or goal or principle-of legal 
practice as a whole, and these convictions will inevitably be dif-
ferent, at least in detail, from those of other judges."3s In Dwor-
kin's prescriptive theory of constitutional interpretation, appeal 
33. ld. at 236. Rawls, interestingly, echoes a doctrine of Hobbes in his notion of 
public reason. Law is the expression of public not private reason, as for Hobbes it is the 
expression of public not private will. Already in Levilltlum the artificial constitution of 
the legitimate principle of action looms into view, as it will continue to do in the thought 
of important Raw !sean predecessors, such as Rousseau with his theory of the general will 
and Kant with his categorical imperative. See Thomas Hobbes, Levillthan 183 (Richard 
Thck ed., Cambridge U. Press, 1991). For discussion, see Michael P. Zuckert, Hobbes, 
Locke, and the Problem of the Rule of Law, in Ian Shapiro, ed., Nomos XXXVIII: The 
Rule of Law (N.Y.U. Press, forthcoming 1994). 
34. Rawls, Political Liberalism VI § 6.2 at 234 (cited in note 2). 
35. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 87-88 (Belknap Press, 1986). 
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to the judge's own best moral understanding and to the judge's 
understanding of the community's moral understanding both 
play a part. For example, Dworkin describes his ideal judge Her-
cules's way of answering questions posed in hard cases: 
Hercules's answer will depend on his convictions about 
the two constituent virtues of political morality we have con-
sidered: justice and fairness. It will depend, that is, not only 
on his beliefs about which of these principles is superior as a 
matter of abstract justice but also about which should be fol-
lowed, as a matter of political fairness, in a community whose 
members have the moral convictions his fellow citizens have.36 
Rawls's theory is so promising because it appears in a cer-
tain specific sense to be more comprehensive than the partisans 
on both side of the old wars. In particular, New Rawls appears 
truly responsive to the important criticisms and objections each 
side had to the other. Perhaps most striking is his great distance 
from the old Rawlseans and his implicit sympathy with the chief 
worries conservative critics always had. Critics of the call for the 
blending of law and moral theory had been bothered by some-
thing rather like what New Rawls is bothered by-the blending 
of law and morality is always going to mean the imposition of 
somebody or other's morality. Robert Bork, one of the leading 
opponents of the old Rawlseans, insists courts should limit them-
selves to text and history; to stray beyond these into the sphere 
of morality is to promote a crisis of legitimacy. A doctrine of 
"moral and ethical values ... has no objective or intrinsic validity 
of its own."37 If the "values" to be embodied in law do not de-
rive from the text or the history of the Constitution, they are an 
illegitimate imposition of somebody's-the judge's-moral val-
ues in place of those of the majority. Rawls does not share 
Bork's skepticism about the nature and cognitive status of moral 
knowledge, but he does share a central part of Bork's concern. 
Even if moral knowledge is genuinely available, the moral views 
of, say, Justice Brennan are unlikely to be persuasive to Bork; 
36. ld. at 249 (footnote omitted}. It should be noted in passing that Dworkin is 
using "political" in the more standard sense and not in Rawls's specific way to distinguish 
political from comprehensive moral doctrines. Cf. id at 3, where Dworkin uses "political 
morality" and "morality" simpliciter interchangeably. Cf. the similar standard of Stephen 
Macedo: "Deciding which interpretation of the case law and history is better requires a 
judgment both about which interpretations adequately fit received legal materials and 
also about which interpretation shows that material in an honourable and morally worthy 
light." Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues 196 (Clarendon Press, 1990) (emphasis in the 
original}. 
37. As quoted in Macedo, Liberal Virtues at 164 (cited in note 36). 
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and, Rawls insists, Bork is quite correct not to want to have Jus-
tice Brennan's (or anyone's) comprehensive moral conception 
shoved down his and the country's throat when he, reasonably, 
does not agree with it. Rawls's insistence that the court is an 
exemplar of public reason and thus not of comprehensive con-
ceptions means that the old Rawlseans, no matter how confident 
they are of the truth and indispensability of morally informed 
jurisprudence, are out of bounds in calling for their particular 
merger of law and morality. 
On the other side, Rawls also implicitly endorses the anti-
originalist claim that the originalists too suffer from a crisis of 
legitimacy. Rawls, like the old Rawlseans, insists that the princi-
ples of constitutional adjudication require a legitimating ration-
ale just as much as other exercises of coercive political authority. 
As Stephen Macedo puts it, "[T]he Constitution, in order to be 
authoritative, must be capable of being read as a reasonable ap-
proximation to principles that pass the test of public justification. 
As supreme law the Constitution needs to be both vindicated and 
justified by interpreters."Js That is to say, not merely must the 
Constitution be "capable of being read" in a legitimating way; it 
must be so read in practice. Such a rationale must be moral, 
which requirement the appeal to majority rule as such does not 
seem to satisfy. Wherein lies the authority of majorities? Or of 
the Founders? Or of the founding generation? Whatever legiti-
mates the Constitution must infuse and legitimate decisions 
taken under it.39 The retreat into a positivist or quasi-positivist 
textualism misses the point of legitimacy. 
Rawls's new constitutional theory thus stands athwart the 
warring camps via his notions of public reason and the political 
conception of justice: the court as exemplar of public reason 
means that the court is to act in light of direct and conscious ap-
peal to the legitimating principles of the system as a whole, but 
not in terms of contentious, controversial comprehensive doc-
trines which Bork and other free and equal citizens have a right 
not to have imposed on them, even by well-meaning and progres-
sive liberal judges. If it works, one would have to say New Rawls 
is unequivocally a better product than the Old Rawlseanism. 
I believe that it is going to take some time for legal and 
political theorists to sort out all the issues involve_d in R_awls's 
new theory. It requires assessment at two places m particular. 
38. ld. at 171. 
39. For an explicitly Rawlsean treatment of this issue, see Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub. 
Aff. at 9-17 (cited in note 28). 
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The one is at its very heart: how valid is Rawls's new idea of a 
political conception of theory as distinguished from a compre-
hensive doctrine? Closely related is the question of how success-
ful Rawls has been in giving us a version of such a political 
conception. These two questions require a kind of exposition 
and analysis I cannot supply here, but do attempt in another es-
say.4o I believe there are a number of serious questions to be 
raised at this level, chief among which perhaps is this: is it not 
remarkable that Rawls has generated as a "political conception" 
more or less the same theory of justice he generated two decades 
earlier as a "comprehensive doctrine?" More than that, investi-
gation shows, I think, that Rawls does in fact surreptitiously ap-
peal to the old theory in order to get the content for his new 
theory. If this claim is correct, then the new theory is merely a 
more or less well concealed version of the sort of comprehensive 
doctrine Rawls himself has shown should not be the basis for 
constitutional adjudication. 
Although this level of question is central to the assessment 
of New Rawls as a whole, I pass it by with only these few remarks 
to take up some narrower questions regarding Rawls's constitu-
tional theory itself. While these are not so decisive for assessing 
the overall validity or value of Political Liberalism, they do help 
us judge whether it can indeed provide an adequate constitu-
tional theory. 
To begin an assessment of Rawls's constitutional theory re-
quires recognizing that despite the sympathies it may have with 
constitutional conservatism it nonetheless sanctions a judicial ap-
proach with much activist bite. He endorses, for example, the 
fully libertarian and activist approach to First Amendment ques-
tions taken by the Warren and Burger Courts.4t More signifi-
cantly, he endorses as required by public reason the most 
controversial decision the recent court has made-Roe v. Wade. 
Under his political conception, a woman has "a duly qualified 
right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the 
first trimester."42 Rawls's constitutional theory thus goes further 
towards the non-interpretivist position than some other impor-
tant mediatory doctrines, such as John Hart Ely's, which might 
also be called political conceptions for their attempt to avoid 
40. Michael P. Zuckert, Is Egalitarian Liberalism Compatible with Limited Govern-
ment? in Christopher Wolfe and Robert George, eds., Liberalism and Natural Law 
(forthcoming). 
41. Rawls, Political Liberalism VIII §§ 10-13 at 340-68 (cited in note 2). 
42. ld. VI § 7.2 at 243 n.32. There is some uncertainty over whether Rawls holds 
this to be a constitutional or merely a moral or political right, however. 
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committing Court and Constitution to one or another compre-
hensive moral doctrine.43 
Because the Constitution must be read in the light of public 
reason, its authority as mere text is qualified and limited for 
Rawls. He does not hesitate to draw the conclusion that a duly 
enacted constitutional amendment clearly at odds with public 
reason so understood could rightfully be resisted by the Court. 
"The Court could say, then that an amendment to repeal the 
First Amendment [establishment clause] and replace it with its 
opposite fundamentally contradicts the constitutional tradition of 
the oldest democratic regime in the world. It is therefore inva-
lid."44 Under the New Rawlsean political theory, then, the Court 
is authorized to be pretty much as activist as under the Old Rawl-
sean comprehensive theory. 
The boundaries of judicial activism under the New Rawlsean 
theory are uncertain, however, for there are significant ambigui-
ties in his formulations that substantially diminish the value of his 
approach for constitutional theory. Two ambiguities in particular 
are troubling. One involves the relationship between text and 
related materials, on the one hand, and public reason as such, on 
the other, within the practice of constitutional adjudication. The 
other ambiguity concerns the relationship between Rawls's own 
justice as fairness as a political conception and other possible le-
gitimate political conceptions of justice. 
In order to understand the first ambiguity, let us conceive of 
three (in principle) separate grounds of decision on constitu-
tional questions. First are the sort of traditional legal materials 
that originalists like Bork consider legitimate-text, history, pre-
cedent, recognized legal principles regarding legal construction, 
and so on. Second are those comprehensive moral doctrines that 
Old Rawlseans like Dworkin or Perry see as valid in addition to 
or as guiding the use of the first set of bases of decision. Finally, 
there is Rawls's specific contribution-the political conception of 
justice and its embodiment in justificatory public reason. Now 
these three may overlap considerably, but surely there are areas 
where they do not. The polemic against originalism explicitly 
carried on by Dworkin and others and implicitly accepted by 
Rawls shows that the first base is not identical to the other two. 
Likewise Rawls's retreat from a comprehensive to a political con-
43. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust· A Theory of Judicial Review (Harv. U. 
Press, 1980). 
44. Rawls, Political Liberalism VI § 6.4 at 239 (cited in note 2). 
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ception shows that the second and third bases do not necessarily 
entirely coincide either. 
Certain aspects of Rawls's position are tolerably clear. As 
we have seen, he rejects exclusive reliance on the first base and 
rejects any reliance on the second. Instead, he calls for some 
combination of the first and the third. The Court's decisions are 
to "reasonably accord with the constitution itself and with its 
amendments and politically mandated interpretations."4s This 
formula and several others like it can be understood in at least 
three different ways, however. First, it might be that the "public 
conception of justice" serves as a regulative "principle of inter-
pretation" for a task that is essentially one of constructing the 
relevant legal materials (Base 1) in the Dworkinian mode of find-
ing the best (biggest) "fit" for all these materials. Perhaps along 
this line, Rawls says that "the best interpretation is the one that 
best fits the relevant body of these constitutional materials, and 
justifies it in terms of the public conception of justice .... "46 
Hence Rawls claims in a footnote to accept (more or less) the 
Dworkinian conception of fit. 
However, in that same footnote, he explicitly takes issue 
with Dworkin's (occasional) view that the "requirement of fit 
alone" is sufficient. "I incline to require, in addition to fit, that in 
order for the court's decision to be a properly judicial decisions 
of law, that the interpretation fall within the public political con-
ception of justice .... "47 This does not necessarily contradict the 
interpretation put forward above, but it does point toward a dif-
ferent method of interpretation. Fit and political conception 
here seem to be in principle two separate ways of finding answers 
to constitutional questions. The acceptable answer is one that 
satisfies both: Rawls suggests that there is some range of alterna-
tive interpretations of the legal materials which satisfy the re-
quirement of fit, but that only those interpretations which also 
fall within the political conception of justice are to be used by the 
Court. 
These formulations may understate the problematic charac-
ter of constitutional interpretation, for they assume what cannot 
be assumed-that there is at least one, and perhaps more, inter-
pretations that "fit" in some strong sense of "make coherent the 
relevant legal materials," and also coincide with the political con-
ception of justice. In many cases either or both of these assump-
45. Id. VI § 6.2 at 234. 
46. Id. VI § 6.3 at 236. 
47. Id. at 237 n.23. 
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tions may not be satisfiable. The example cited earlier, abortion, 
might be just such a case, for although the political conception 
affirms such a right, no argument has ever been put forward to 
my knowledge which persuasively shows that an interpretation 
"fitting" all the relevant legal materials comes to the same con-
clusion. Surely Justice Blackmun managed no such showing. 
Whatever one thinks of this particular example, it must be admit-
ted in principle that instances of non-overlap are conceivable and 
even likely. What about these cases? What if the "fit" require-
ment points to one conclusion in a constitutional case and the 
political conception to another? What, for example, if the people 
adopt an amendment repealing the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment? We already have Rawls's answer: the polit-
ical conception is to come into play and to have priority over the 
most obvious kind of "fit" arguments. Given Rawls's emphasis 
on the relation between the political conception and public rea-
son on the one hand, and legitimacy on the other, this priority for 
the conclusions of public reason makes sense. Thus on occasion 
Rawls uses formulae which suggest a more independent role for 
public reason: "[T]he political values of public reason provide the 
Court's basis for interpretation."4s Rawls thus identifies the 
"political conception of justice" with the "higher law" said to be 
embodied in or pointed toward by the Constitution.49 
So far as Rawls leans to a more or less independent role for 
the political conception of justice, he of course retreats from the 
concern with fit and the sway of the legal materials as such. Per-
haps for this reason, he hesitates to endorse unequivocally the 
notion of the independent power of the political conception, 
qualifying it with somewhat more moderate claims such as the 
following: "the justices may and do appeal to the political values 
of the public conception whenever the constitution itself ex-
pressly or implicitly invokes those values, as it does, for example, 
in a bill of rights guaranteeing the free exercise of religion or the 
equal protection of the laws."so Judges thus seem free to appeal 
to the political conception only when the Constitution "invokes 
those values," but it is difficult to know whether this is a real 
limitation or not, for, if the political conception has something to 
say on a given constitutional issue, presumably then the Constitu-
tion must "invoke those values" (raise the issue?) in some sense 
or other-not necessarily in the same sense as the political con-
48. ld. § 6.2 at 234. 
49. ld.; cf. § 6.1 at 232. 
50. ld. VI § 6.3 at 236. 
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ception, for if that were the case, then the appeal to the political 
conception would be quite superfluous. The Constitution's "in-
vocation" would presumably be quite sufficient to settle matters. 
Thus Rawls does not say anything to the effect that the political 
conception can be used only when it leads to the same answer as 
the more traditional legal materials. 
Rawls thus has three distinguishable versions of the role of 
the political conception of justice in constitutional decisionmak-
ing. The political conception can be (1) an interpretive principle, 
governing the effort to construe the legal materials, present from 
the outset in the interpretive process; (2) a conjunctive require-
ment to be deployed along with independently derived "fitting" 
interpretations; or (3) an independent force in interpretation, 
and in the final analysis a trump over other kinds of interpreta-
tion. No one of the above alternate versions of Rawls's interpre-
tive theory is clearly correct. He seems genuinely unclear on the 
desirable or legitimate relationship between the legal materials 
and the political conception. But that, of course, is just where the 
drink needs its fizz. Rawls is more ambiguous than some of the 
old Rawlseans or the Borkeans precisely because he is so sensi-
tive to the dual imperatives of constitutionalism, and the dual 
dangers any approach to constitutional interpretation must 
avoid. In a word, his focus on imposition points him in two quite 
different directions; it leads him to require a legitimating ration-
ale for legal actions, but it also makes him chary of philosopher-
judges imposing their conceptions of justice independently of 
law. The political conception, after all, is one that "all citizens 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles 
and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational." That 
requirement does not exhaust itself in legitimating a democratic 
process, but it does point that way in part, and it leads Rawls to 
hesitate to arm judges with an altogether independent power to 
appeal to the political conception over and against law. The am-
biguities in Rawls, in other words, reflect the fact that he has 
discovered in his own way the deep tension at the core of law as 
such. It has and requires a moral justification which always 
stands ready to judge it and correct it, and yet law as law is never 
just the same as its moral justification and requires some locus 
and mode of formulation and promulgation which claims validity 
for its products as such. There is, I suspect, no real solution to 
this problem. Our contemporary Borkeans and Old Rawlseans 
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each see but one side of the dilemma.st Rawls's major innova-
tion, the notion of the political conception, shows greater sensi-
tivity to both sides of the dilemma, but contributes nothing to its 
solution. That would be fine, if Rawls were aware of the di-
lemma he has uncovered. Instead, his solution either gives too 
much to the Old Rawlsean side, or wavers uncertainly between 
formulae which weigh in now on one and now on the other side. 
That Rawls's notion of a political conception does not 
change the nature of the problem, or contribute to its solution, is 
indicated by the second major ambiguity in his theory-this one 
concerning the relation between justice as fairness and other pos-
sible political conceptions. The dilemma at the heart of law, and 
especially constitutional law, often emerges as the question of 
whose moral conceptions are to judge and justify positive law. 
The Rawlsean notion of a political conception at first appears to 
be an ingenious response to that question: nobody's moral con-
ception is to judge and justify, if by that we mean a comprehen-
sive doctrine, but everybody's is, if we look to a political 
conception which articulates, extends, and renders coherent 
ideas present in the public political culture and thus (somehow) 
accepted by all. Nonetheless, Rawls does not escape the problem 
of whose morality is to trump so easily as he assumes, for he 
concedes that there are an indefinite number of political concep-
tions, and there will be disagreement among these just as there is 
on comprehensive doctrines.s2 The problem of imposition thus 
recurs at the second order level of political conceptions. Indeed 
the problem is so severe that it is not clear that Rawls gives us 
any reason to suppose the broader "impasse" from which he be-
gins can any more readily be broken by recourse to political con-
ceptions than by the comprehensive conceptions themselves. 
Since Rawls provides little discussion of possible political con-
ceptions other than his own, it is difficult to know how much va-
riation he expects these to contain. He seems to anticipate less 
variety among political conceptions than among comprehensive 
conceptions. All the political conceptions will belong to a "fam-
ily of liberal theories of justice," a family whose family resem-
blance will inhere, it appears, in their acceptance of the freedom 
and equality of citizens within a democratic constitutional sys-
tem. Surely this is a narrower range of views than exists, say, 
between Robert Filmer and Karl Marx, but it still seems so broad 
51. For fuller discussion, see Zuckert, Hobbes, Locke, and the Problem of Rule of 
Law (cited in note 33). 
52. Cf. Rawls, Political Liberalism VI § 6.3 at 237 (cited in note 2). 
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as not to satisfy Rawls's initial desire to overcome the "impasse 
of our times" nor to provide a clear-cut and legitimate (non-im-
posing) basis for constitutional decision. It does not overcome 
the impasse of our time because, Rawls says, that impasse is pre-
cisely over the meaning and implications of free and equal citi-
zenship in a liberal democracy. It does not provide a satisfactory 
basis for judicial action, because it provides no second order con-
sensus, or even potential consensus, to replace first order dissen-
sus. Recall Rawls's initial statement of his "hope of developing 
from ... shared fundamental ideas ... a political conception that 
can gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment." By the time 
he comes to the end of his exposition, Rawls seems to step way 
back from this hope, so central to the justification for his whole 
project. 
In a word, New Rawls's constitutional theory is beset with so 
many uncertainties, ambiguities, and insufficiently settled ques-
tions, that even if the broader political philosophy to which it is 
attached is viable, the constitutional theory does not appear to be 
so. So far as New Rawls does taste better, it is because his theory 
now better captures the competing considerations that make the 
enterprise of constitutional theory so difficult and satisfactory an-
swers so elusive: New Rawls shows sympathy now with the legiti-
mate concerns of Robert Bork, as well as with those of Ronald 
Dworkin. But, I think it fair to say, New Rawls will nonetheless 
not play so large a role during Constitutional Commentary's sec-
ond decade as his earlier incarnation did during Constitutional 
Commentary's first decade. New Rawls is a little sweeter but it 
just hasn't got enough fizz. 
